I have prepared notes on “Universality and the cost of basic pensions” for presentation at a meeting convened by HelpAge International, and thought that they might be of interest to at least some TdJ readers. These brief notes bring together my thoughts on means tests, and why I believe that they are almost always inferior to universal benefits.
A typical reaction to universal pensions is “That’s a great idea, but we can’t afford it, so prefer to give pensions only to those who need them”. This reaction appears to be common sense, but it is wrong. Means tests shift costs, but do not lower them because means tests are taxes on income or assets. They are paid by elderly citizens and, sometimes, their families. It is more efficient to fund basic pensions with general taxes paid by everyone. All taxes, with the exception of head taxes, distort choices. Of particular concern are taxes that discourage work and saving. Low taxes levied on an entire population are less distorting than high taxes levied on the elderly.
This is the efficiency argument for universality. It is valid even with costless and perfect targeting, with no stigma, no exclusion errors, no erosion of political support. It is a simple argument, yet often ignored because means tests are usually recorded as expenditure reductions rather than as tax collections. Framing is important. A message that means tests are taxes could appeal to voters across the political spectrum.
It is important to recognize that, even though universality is optimal, all means tests are not equally bad. Clear, simple rules are preferable to complex regulations that leave discretion to government bureaucrats. Rules matter more than whether the number disqualified by targeting is small (an ‘affluence test’) or large (a ‘means test’?). The term ‘affluence test’ is imprecise and adds nothing to our understanding of means tests.
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afford it, so prefer to give pensions only to those who need them”. This reaction
appears to be common sense, but it is wrong. Means tests shift costs, but do not
lower them because means tests are taxes on income or assets. They are paid by
elderly citizens and, sometimes, their families. It is more efficient to fund
basic pensions with general taxes paid by everyone. All taxes, with the exception
of head taxes, distort choices. Of particular concern are taxes that discourage
work and saving. Low taxes levied on an entire population are less distorting
than high taxes levied on the elderly.
This is the efficiency argument for universality. It is valid even with costless
and perfect targeting, with no stigma, no exclusion errors, no erosion of
political support. It is a simple argument, yet often ignored because means tests
are usually recorded as expenditure reductions rather than as tax collections.
Framing is important. A message that means tests are taxes could appeal to voters
across the political spectrum.
It is important to recognize that, even though universality is optimal, all means
tests are not equally bad. Clear, simple rules are preferable to complex
regulations that leave discretion to government bureaucrats. Rules matter more
than whether the number disqualified by targeting is small (an ‘affluence test’)
or large (a ‘means test’?). The term ‘affluence test’ is imprecise and adds
nothing to our understanding of means tests.