Posts Tagged ‘targeting’

the cost of universal pensions

Thursday, February 2nd, 2012

I have prepared notes on “Universality and the cost of basic pensions” for presentation at a meeting convened by HelpAge International, and thought that they might be of interest to at least some TdJ readers. These brief notes bring together my thoughts on means tests, and why I believe that they are almost always inferior to universal benefits.

A typical reaction to universal pensions is “That’s a great idea, but we can’t afford it, so prefer to give pensions only to those who need them”. This reaction appears to be common sense, but it is wrong. Means tests shift costs, but do not lower them because means tests are taxes on income or assets. They are paid by elderly citizens and, sometimes, their families. It is more efficient to fund basic pensions with general taxes paid by everyone. All taxes, with the exception of head taxes, distort choices. Of particular concern are taxes that discourage work and saving. Low taxes levied on an entire population are less distorting than high taxes levied on the elderly.

This is the efficiency argument for universality. It is valid even with costless and perfect targeting, with no stigma, no exclusion errors, no erosion of political support. It is a simple argument, yet often ignored because means tests are usually recorded as expenditure reductions rather than as tax collections. Framing is important. A message that means tests are taxes could appeal to voters across the political spectrum.

It is important to recognize that, even though universality is optimal, all means tests are not equally bad. Clear, simple rules are preferable to complex regulations that leave discretion to government bureaucrats. Rules matter more than whether the number disqualified by targeting is small (an ‘affluence test’) or large (a ‘means test’?). The term ‘affluence test’ is imprecise and adds nothing to our understanding of means tests.

…. continued here.

A typical reaction to universal pensions is “That’s a great idea, but we can’t
afford it, so prefer to give pensions only to those who need them”. This reaction
appears to be common sense, but it is wrong. Means tests shift costs, but do not
lower them because means tests are taxes on income or assets. They are paid by
elderly citizens and, sometimes, their families. It is more efficient to fund
basic pensions with general taxes paid by everyone. All taxes, with the exception
of head taxes, distort choices. Of particular concern are taxes that discourage
work and saving. Low taxes levied on an entire population are less distorting
than high taxes levied on the elderly.

This is the efficiency argument for universality. It is valid even with costless
and perfect targeting, with no stigma, no exclusion errors, no erosion of
political support. It is a simple argument, yet often ignored because means tests
are usually recorded as expenditure reductions rather than as tax collections.
Framing is important. A message that means tests are taxes could appeal to voters
across the political spectrum.

It is important to recognize that, even though universality is optimal, all means
tests are not equally bad. Clear, simple rules are preferable to complex
regulations that leave discretion to government bureaucrats. Rules matter more
than whether the number disqualified by targeting is small (an ‘affluence test’)
or large (a ‘means test’?). The term ‘affluence test’ is imprecise and adds
nothing to our understanding of means tests.

non-contributory pensions in Mexico

Sunday, January 22nd, 2012

It is difficult to keep up with events in Mexico. The pension scene changes almost daily.

The extension of the rural 70+ scheme to urban areas is now official, and was communicated to the nation last Tuesday (17 January) by President Felipe Calderón, speaking in Naucalpan, a city located just northwest of Mexico City in adjoining State of Mexico which – in sharp contrast to Mexico City – offers no pensions to its elderly citizens. Anyone who receives an earnings-related pension from the social security system (IMSS) or from the civil service (ISSSTE) is not eligible for an urban 70+ pension. Urban pension benefits are identical to those of rural pensions – $500 pesos (US$37) a month – but urban beneficiaries will receive bi-monthly credits on a debit card, whereas rural beneficiaries receive benefits in cash or direct deposits.

Will rural pensions now be pension-tested as well? This is not clear. The government’s 70+ webpage continues to list only three requirements for eligibility:

a) Be at least 70 years old
b) Reside in a community with 30,000 inhabitants or less
c) Agree to suspend any benefit the applicant might receive from the [federal] Human Development Programme Oportunidades

The webpage offers no information for applicants who reside in communities larger than 30,000 inhabitants. For a government that prides itself on transparency, this lack of information is troubling.

I fear the worse. The conservative PAN (National Action Party) that controls the executive branch of the federal government has opposed non-contributory pensions in general, and universal pensions in particular. The former Mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (born 1953), initiated universal pensions in 2001, then ran for President of Mexico in the federal elections of 2006. He lost by one percentage point to the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón (born 1962), in a contested vote. AMLO promised, if elected, to extend Mexico City’s universal pension to all Mexico. Calderón, backed by the then incumbent President Vicente Fox (also from the PAN), repeatedly and strongly voiced his disagreement with AMLO’s pension manifesto. It was AMLO’s political allies in Congress who initiated – with no support from President Calderón – legislation for the rural 70+ pension scheme. Have the views of Felipe Calderón and his party changed so radically? I sincerely hope so. But I doubt it. This might well be strategic behaviour in an election year. This is why I fear the worse. (Mexican presidential elections take place every six years, and the incumbent is not allowed to run for re-election.)

At a minimum, I have no doubt that the government will eventually subject pensions in rural areas to the same tests as pensions in urban communities, although they may wait until after the 2012 elections to do this. It defies logic to think that rural applicants will escape a pensions test to which urban residents are subjected.

What will happen to state programmes when the federal 70+ programme commences in urban areas? Will pensioners in states with generous benefits be forced to shift to the federal scheme, with reduced benefits? This question is especially important for Mexico City, where universal pension benefits are $897 pesos a month, almost double the $500 pesos of the 70+ scheme. Moreover, the age of eligibility in Mexico City fell in 2009 from 70 to 68 years, and benefits are indexed to consumer prices. In the case of 70+, both benefits and the age of eligibility have been frozen since 2007. This is not a prediction, but one possibility is that the federal government might allow state governments to top up the federal benefit, and/or provide full benefits to seniors younger than 70 years.

A universal minimum pension for all Mexicans, with allowance for state top-ups and early pensions, would introduce only modest complexity into the 70+ scheme, with a simple pension test that does not stigmatise beneficiaries.

My fear is that the federal government will not stop with a pensions-test, but will instead move on either to geographic targeting or to more stringent means-tests. Geographic targeting is very crude. Some districts of urban Mexico contain both mansions and shacks, so there will be inevitable errors of inclusion and exclusion. Individualised means tests have even more problems, not least of which is more opportunity for corruption, for payment of ‘mordidas’ (bribes) to officials so that they will certify an applicant as poor.

The information so far is mixed, so it is difficult to know whether tests of eligibility will go beyond age, residence and income from other pensions. Officials from the federal ministry of social development (SEDESOL) in Chihuahua and Guanajuato told journalists that the their goal is to ensure that all residents aged 70 years and older, regardless of socioeconomic status, have a pension. The position of SEDESOL officials in Chiapas and Yucatan, in contrast, is that the 70+ programme will be targeted to those living in poverty in urban areas, but they never define what they mean by “poverty”. The news report from Yucatan is especially detailed. The representative of SEDESOL in Yucatan explained that applicants with no other pension income, who meet age and residence requirements, will be invited to provide the information required for a socioeconomic information card (Cédula Única de Información Socioeconómica). This procedure takes about 35 minutes. Those whose applications are approved can expect the bi-monthly pension to commence in May/June of this year.

The mixed information and lack of guidelines for this initiative is worrisome. So much for the transparency and clear rules promised by President Calderón!

the poverty of means tests

Saturday, January 21st, 2012

UVic economist Christopher Willmore is blogging again! His latest post is an essay on universality versus targeting. This is his conclusion:

“Stay poor, and we’ll help out – if you manage to make it through all the bureaucratic hurdles. Try to get out of poverty, and we’ll pull the rug out from under you.” That’s the basic message of means-testing. Targeting benefits to the poorest makes work very expensive. If benefits are universal, we don’t see this disincentive to participating in the job market. If flipping burgers at McDonald’s doesn’t cost you your child grant, and you’re able to keep all or most of what you make, you’re more likely to take that fast food job, and maybe use it as a springboard for a more valuable career later on.

Means testing is one of those obvious notions that is actually a pretty crummy idea when you look at it closely. Unfortunately, its common sense appeal makes it very popular. Nearly every government in the world uses it as a linchpin of its social welfare program, and in the current global recession many nations are looking to tighten their welfare requirements. Instead, they should be loosening them.

Christopher Willmore, “To help the poor, help everyone“, Stray Silvers, 20 January 2012.

Christopher runs through each of “the top five reasons why means testing is often a bad idea”. Be sure to click on the links to articles that illustrate his points.

toward universal pensions in Panama

Monday, December 19th, 2011

Thought du Jour has been monitoring an interesting development in Panama. The government that took office in July of 2009 launched a programme with the name “100 a los 70″, meaning one hundred (dollars) a month at the age of seventy. In Panama, one hundred dollars is a modest sum, equal to 25% of the country’s minimum wage, or 14% of its per capita GDP.

Approximately 160,000 of Panama’s three and a half million residents are aged 70 and older. According to official government sources (see below), 85,000 of them – more than half of those who would qualify by age alone – are receiving a one hundred dollar monthly pension. The number was previously somewhat higher, but “more than 7 thousand” beneficiaries were removed from the list.

From early yesterday morning, beneficiaries of the “100 a los 70″ programme went to various branches of the National Bank and the Savings Bank to receive payments corresponding to the last three months of the year – a total of three hundred dollars for the last quarter. Officials of the Ministry of Social Development say that payments will be made by December 17 to approximately 85,000 older adults. ….

The Ministry of Social Development (Mides) has purified the list by removing more than 7,000 older adults from the program.

Jessica Perez, program director, explained that this purification was accomplished by crossing the list of beneficiaries with records of different entities such as the Land Registry, the National Lottery and the Department of Motor Vehicles.

100 a los 70 y su último pago del 2011“, La Estrella, 10 December 2011. (Spanish original, translated by Larry Willmore.]

Now, why would a person aged 70 years or older be denied a pension. According to written rules, posted on the internet, an applicant for the “100 a los 70″ benefit has to satisfy “only the following requirements or conditions”:

1. At least 70 years of age
2. No access to other pension or retirement income
3. Panamanian nationality
4. Residence in Panama

Mides (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social), “Programas:  100 a los 70“.  (Spanish original, translated by Larry Willmore)

This is very clear. The Panamanian pension is a universal minimum pension. There is no wealth test, and the only income test is one of retirement income. Presumably the beneficiary can continue to work and still receive an age pension.

But why, then, would the Ministry want to look into a beneficiary’s holdings of land, lottery tickets or motor vehicles? What possible relevance could these assets have?

Further down, in explanations published at the link above, the plot thickens.

Must the beneficiary reciprocate in any way?

Yes older people must have health checkups and must participate in discussions, lectures, courses, seminars and medical counselling. To receive a pension, the beneficiary should request certification of each health checkup and of participation in informative activities and show this certification to social promoters when they carry out their supervisory duties.

Ah! This seems, to me, to be an obstacle designed to stigmatise, to discourage the moderately affluent from asking for a pension.

There are more explanations. And the application process becomes more complex.

Can the benefit be suspended?

Yes will be suspended in the following cases:

Death of the beneficiary
Misuse of money
Change in eligibility status

What is considered misuse of the money from the program?

The program “100 at 70″ regards as misuse the spending of money on any activities that do not result in an improved quality of life. Examples are expenditures on gambling, alcohol, drugs and narcotics.

Ah! Panama requires recipients of its social pension to refrain from alcoholic drink, gambling other unhealthy activities. This is similar to the rules set up by Victorian poor laws in Britain and its colonies, which required beneficiaries to be of “good moral character” (Victorian code for ‘sober’).

I still could not understand why possession of land or an automobile should disqualify an otherwise sober and elderly Panamanian. My suspicion is that the government has wide discretion in deciding which applicants for an age pension should be rejected. My worst fears were confirmed when I read the following statement, published last year on the web page of the Government of Panama:

Social Development Minister Guillermo Ferrufino, in the Legislature, denounced that people of “high economic status” are taking advantage of the “100 at 70″ programme intended for older adults living in poverty.

“We had some situations of citizens high economic status joining the project and of others who are not making good use of the money,” Ferrufino said, referring to those who own farms, rental properties and other assets, so have no need for do not need support from the state.

He recalled that “100 at 70″ began with … 72,000 older adults; however, after more than a year of operation, the number of beneficiaries has increased to 88,000 people ….

He indicated that he anticipated “hiring of social promoters” to determine the exact conditions of those who need this state support.

“Now is the time … to put a final end to unscrupulous people who have inserted themselves into the project and do not need it,” the minister added.

Mides (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social), “Ministro presenta modificaciones a la Ley de 100 a los 70“, 13 October 2010. (Spanish original, translated by Larry Willmore)

This is not good. Vague and complex rules for eligibility can transform an otherwise useful social programme into a nest of corruption and clientelism. Stay tuned for more information. TdJ will continue to monitor developments. Hopefully opposition parties – or the press – will shed light on this.

Thailand’s 500 baht universal minimum pension

Tuesday, December 6th, 2011

Last March, I posted  a note on Thailand’s move toward universal pensions. Today I am posting an update, gleaned from a new paper written by two Bangkok-based researchers. A means-tested social pension in 1993 preceded Thailand’s ‘universal’ scheme. In the early years, fewer than 400,000 elderly persons qualified for pensions. In 2005 screening of applications was outsourced to local authorities and by 2006 more than a million elderly pensioners were receiving 500 baht (about US$15) each month. By March 2009, the last month of means-tests, pensioners on the list numbered 1.9 million.

In practice, there were many limitations to the implementation of a means-tested old-age allowance system. All local authorities had to follow the process that was made clear by the Ministry of Interior …. However, … the local authorities’ understanding of the process was extremely diversified. Some allocated the transfer to all elderly without applying any means-tested eligibility criteria while others followed the process strictly. …. More than 50 per cent of underprivileged elderly did not receive the old-age allowance ….

The implementation failure forced the Government to go from a means-tested to a universal scheme. …. The change in government ideology was also a critical factor in the transformation. It was reflected in the policy speech that Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajiva delivered … in April 2009, in which he showed concern that the old-age allowance be a right for the elderly and a reward representing gratitude from society

The 500 Baht Universal Pension Scheme officially started in April 2009 ….

All elderly (60 years of age and older) who are not in elderly public facilities or do not receive permanent income (i.e., recipients of a government pension, government-employed persons) are eligible for the Scheme. ….

Thailand is gradually moving from a targeting approach to universalism. For both health and elderly-income allowances, the country previously used a targeting approach because of fiscal constraints. However, there was concrete evidence that the poor were not protected properly and some non-poor received this benefit from both inclusion and exclusion errors.

An egalitarian approach to providing equal access to necessary health and social services was debated in the 1970s. Two decades later, after the economic crisis, social movements successfully managed to have the concept included in the 1997 Constitution, which led to a universal health-coverage policy in 2002. The efforts of other social movements and further advocacy by the organizations of the elderly pushed the idea of universal elderly income security into the 2007 Constitution. ….

Although mainstream social protection in Thailand is moving towards more egalitarian policies, the balance of social risk management between individuals and institutions is still a topic of hot debate, especially regarding the pension system. Many affluent groups advocate libertarian or laissez-faire views.

Thaworn Sakunphanit and Worawet Suwanrada, “The 500 Baht Universal Pension Scheme“, Sharing Innovative Experiences (Volume 18, UNDP, New York, 2011), pp. 401-415.

Thaworn Sakunphanit is Deputy Director of the Health Insurance System Research Office (HISRO). Worawet Suwanrada is Associate Professor (economics) in Chulalongkorn University.

The new scheme is almost a universal minimum pension, ‘almost’ because it excludes only government pensioners and only government employees. There is a pension test and a retirement test, but they apparently apply only to workers in the public sector.

There is much more in the full paper. One item (pp. 403-404) that caught my attention is a proposal to establish an “additional pension scheme for the working population in the informal sector” to supplement the 500 baht pension. The legislation, which is awaiting approval by Parliament, calls for creation of a voluntary, government-managed pension fund. Each member would contribute 100 baht (US$3)a month, with Government adding another 50 to 100 baht, “depending on the contributor’s age”. Contributions can be skipped without penalty. When contributors reach pensionable age (60 years), their balances will be transformed into life annuities and added to the 500 baht minimum pension.

This is an experiment worth watching. I suspect that no contributory scheme can attract participants who are very poor, but this one might attract significant numbers of those who are better-off. Government subsidies might, though, end up in hands of those who least need them. Another danger is the potential for government waste: administrative costs can be very high for such small accounts.

Update: The elderly (aged 60+) in Thailand are thought to number 7.24 million. 5% (361,000) are government employees or pensioners, so not eligible for a 500 baht pension. As of September 2010, 5.65 million were receiving a 500 baht pension, leaving approximately 1.23 million to be registered. Recall that when the scheme started in April of 2009, there were only 1.9 million pensioners, so the registration process has gone very well. Note also that the fiscal savings from exclusion of civil servants is not large. Total expenditure on the programme in fiscal year 2010 amounted to 0.37% of GDP.

old age assistance in Hong Kong

Monday, December 5th, 2011

There is limited takeup of means-tested benefits by Hong Kong’s elderly population, despite the fact that many live in abject poverty. Oxfam commissioned a survey of the elderly poor and discovered that the reluctance to apply for benefits is a consequence of the stigma of the application process, which requires adult children to declare that they are unable to support their parents.

According to Oxfam’s survey, ”The living and health conditions of poor elderly people not on Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) and their attitudes towards social security”, conducted in December 2010, 92.8% of the [541] elderly respondents, though qualified [by low income], had never applied for CSSA. Moreover, although the majority of respondents (91.5%) had heard of CSSA previously, 70.6% of them perceived that the application procedure for CSSA was complicated. For example, the current system only accepts an application for CSSA on a household basis when the total income and assets of ALL FAMILY MEMBERS in the same household are taken into account in determining the family’s eligibility for assistance. Poor elderly people, though living on an income below the CSSA payment level, cannot apply for CSSA alone; they must apply on a household basis. This implies that poor elderly people can receive CSSA only if their sons or daughters declare they are not financially able to support their parents. This kind of procedure poses a barrier for poor elderly people in applying for CSSA.

Oxfam Hong Kong, “Position paper on the CSSA Scheme“, Hong Kong Legislative Council, Panel on Welfare Services, 18 January 2011.

To add insult to injury, the means-tested allowance is a maximum of HK$2,555 (US$325) a month, a very modest sum in a city where incomes on average are equal to those of the European Union.

Pinochet’s Chile: model for US pension reform?

Tuesday, October 18th, 2011

Herman Cain, the former pizza executive surging in polls for the Republican presidential nomination, wants to replace Social Security with what he called the “Chilean model” of private pension funds. ….

Chile’s system, introduced under the 1973-1990 dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet, diverted workers’ contributions into privately run funds, slashing government revenue over the next few decades in exchange for a reduction in state pension payments 30 years down the line.

The military regime prepared for the new system in 1981 by cutting spending, building up a fiscal surplus and clamping down on all forms of dissent. ….

“For the U.S. right now it would be impossible,” said Alejandro Micco, who was the chief economist at Chile’s Finance Ministry until last year. To change to a private pension system “you either need to have a very big fiscal surplus to pay retirees without income from workers, or go into debt.” ….

José Piñera, brother of Chile’s current President Sebastián Piñera, designed the pension system when he was Pinochet’s labor minister. He now travels around the world touting its benefits …. He declined to be interviewed for this article, citing engagements in Europe.

Twenty-seven years after starting the system, … Chile’s government felt the need to reform it. In 2008, they started a minimum pension for people who had made contributions for 20 years and raised payments for people who had no pension provisions.

Sebastian Boyd, “Cain’s Social Security Model Risks Miring U.S. in Deeper Debt“, Bloomberg Businessweek, 17 October 2011.

The information in the final paragraph above is incomplete and misleading. Pinochet’s government provided – from 1975 – a small assistance pension targeted, supposedly, to the poorest 15% of the elderly population. In practice, much of this assistance went to those who were not poor, and many of the poor died waiting for a pension. The 1981 reform of José Piñera added a minimum pension for those with a contribution record of at least 240 months. This minimum pension was paid by taxpayers, was very costly, and went predominately to contributors (mostly housewives) in the upper half of the household income distribution. The 2008 reform replaces the poorly-targeted assistance pension and the regressive minimum pension with a single, flat “Solidarity Pension” for those in the lowest 60% of the income distribution. The Solidarity Pension functions almost as a universal minimum pension because it is recovered from other pension income.

Thanks to Andrew Biggs for the pointer.

universal pensions vs universal minimum pensions

Friday, October 7th, 2011

Notes for a keynote address that I will deliver on November 27th to the Symposium “International Experiences on Universal Pensions” at the Polytechnic University of Hong Kong. The event is sponsored by Alliance for Universal Pensions (Hong Kong), an umbrella political action group.

Universal pensions and universal minimum pensions – the experience of Mexico City, Chile and Norway

by Larry Willmore, Research Scholar, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria

Universal pensions and universal minimum pensions are similar, with one important difference. A Universal Pension is a flat amount paid from general government revenue to all who qualify by residence or citizenship once they reach a designated age. Benefits are given regardless of a person’s employment history, income, assets, or retirement status. A Universal Minimum Pension is different only because it is tested against other pension income. It provides fewer benefits – or none at all – to those with sufficiently large employment-related pensions. This pension test is equivalent to a tax on pension income.

The three cases that I discuss illustrate distinct paths to – and from – universal systems. Mexico City is a wonderful example of successful and speedy implementation of a universal pension. Chile’s tortured history, with reforms in 1975, 1981 and 2008, has left the country with a unique hybrid of minimum pensions and social assistance pensions. Norway, which had a universal pension in the past, now provides only minimum pensions to the elderly who meet residence requirements and are not gainfully employed.

Mexico City’s modest, universal pension has functioned effectively and efficiently for ten years, without a hint of corruption.

In 1981, Chile introduced a major reform. Its most-publicised component was a switch of the contributory system from collective, pay-as-you-go pensions, to individual, pre-funded accounts.  Another, less-known component of the 1981 reform was the introduction of a minimum pension. It was twice as large as the assistance pension, with no limit on the number of beneficiaries, who were drawn almost exclusively from the wealthiest half of Chilean households.

There has been much disappointment in Chile with the 1981 reform. A 2008 change replaced the poorly-targeted assistance pension and the regressive minimum pension with a single “Solidarity Pension”, recovered from other pension income. The rate of recovery was initially set at 100%, but is now 50% and will fall to 37.5% next year (2012).

Chile’s “Solidarity Pension” is a minimum pension, but it is not universal because households in the upper 40% of the income distribution are not eligible for benefits. It remains to be seen whether targeting will be more accurate for this pension than it was for the assistance pension that it replaces. In time, the system might evolve into a true “minimum universal pension” or even into a universal pension.

Norway had a universal pension from 1959, but only for ten years. In 1969, the government re-introduced income-tests and became an all-too-common example of governments forcing citizens to save in order to replace a universal, flat pension with individual pensions. Norway now guarantees each qualified person a generous minimum pension that effectively amounts to 45% of the average net wage.  This is tested against other pension income and recovered at the rate of 80%.

Incentives matter. My three case studies illustrate how a government’s intervention in retirement incomes, particularly with regard to income tests, can change behaviour but often in unintended ways.  They also suggest that the more detailed the intervention, the greater is the likelihood of even greater future interventions.

Correction: With the 2011 reform, retirement from work is no longer required for receipt of a pension in Norway.

Proxy Means Testing

Tuesday, October 4th, 2011

PMT is a curse! Sisters, you all know that: inescapable, debilitating, emotionally draining, a regular cause of extreme irritability! But I refer here not to Pre-Menstrual Tension, but rather to a new form of PMT that is sweeping the globe: Proxy Means Testing.

This variant of PMT is a method of selecting poor people to become beneficiaries of social transfer programmes, currently being advocated strongly by, among others, my good friends at the World Bank. Proxy means tests generate a score for each applicant household, based on “fairly easy to observe characteristics of the household such as the location and quality of its dwelling, its ownership of durable goods, demographic structure of the household, and the education and, possibly, the occupations of adult members”.  The specific indicators used in calculating this score and their relative weights are derived from statistical analysis (usually regression or principal components analysis) of data from detailed household surveys.

PMT is touted as generating “impressive” results; it claims to be based on “statistically rigorous methods”; in Chile (where it all began), it exhibits an “excellent record” of targeting; in Fiji, it has been pushed as being “highly reliable”; in Jamaica, “leakage errors are less than 3 percent”; etc. As a result, the World Bank claims that PMT is “objective”, that it has fewer disincentive effects than a true means test, and that it has been “proven to work particularly well in countries with high levels of informality and where personal and household income is difficult to verify with any degree of precision”. Overall, the advocates of PMT paint a happy picture of a scientifically sound, technocratically robust and dispassionately objective solution to poverty targeting.

But a recent paper, Targeting the Poorest, suggests that the reality is very different, and cautions policymakers strongly against the dangers of being steamrollered into the adoption of PMT. It suggests that the PMT approach is demonstrably deficient ….

[T]he paper finds that – despite all the grandiose claims of its proponents – PMT performs lamentably in targeting the poor.  It concludes that a striking finding of the analysis was the consistency of the magnitude of errors across countries …. It counsels policymakers to bear in mind “this combination of theoretical errors means a majority of eligible poor households may be permanently excluded from social grant benefits as a result of PMT scoring”.

Afternoon (“PM”) Teese, “Poxy Means Testing“, Wahenga, 27 September 2011.

The cited paper is only 32 pages long (plus appendices) and worth reading. One interesting finding is that, the tighter the targeting, the greater the ‘leakage’ of benefits (to the non-poor) and the higher the errors of exclusion (of eligible poor from benefits).

Using data from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Rwanda and Sri Lanka, the study looked at the regression accuracy of the PMT methodology at coverage levels between 5% and 40% of the population. It found that exclusion and inclusion errors vary between 44% and 55% respectively when 20% of the population is covered and between 57% and 71% respectively when 10% is covered. At these coverage levels—which are realistic for many programs in developing countries with limited financial resources—eligible households have no better than a one-in-two chance of being selected, and in some cases even view proxy means testing as a lottery. ….

Other approaches to social protection propose different ways of targeting that may be easier to implement, socially less divisive and politically popular. For example, there are growing calls for developing countries to build social protection systems that direct resources to vulnerable groups—such as older people, children, persons with disability and the unemployed—on a universal basis.  Sound evidence exists that targeting vulnerable groups on a universal basis may generate a higher level of political support than an approach focused on developing large-scale ‘safety nets’ that may exclude a majority of the poor. While such universal targeting approaches have been adopted by many developed countries and an increasing number of developing countries, there are important trade-offs relative to other forms of targeting that need to be considered, relating to financial, social and political costs, and coverage of the poor. [Emphasis added.]

Stephen Kidd and Emily Wylde, Targeting the Poorest: An assessment of the proxy means test methodology, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Canberra, September 2011, pp. 31, 32.

Thanks to Charles Knox of HelpAge International for the pointer.

the problems of means-testing

Friday, September 23rd, 2011

Andrew Biggs, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, explains in detail why proposals to means test Social Security (public pensions) and Medicare (healthcare for the elderly) are a bad idea. He suggests an alternative way to reduce benefits flowing to the wealthy.

The appeal of means-testing is easy to see. It would dramatically reduce entitlement spending, and in a way that could be justified as commonsense: Since we don’t have the money to give benefits to everyone, we should give benefits only to people who need them most. ….

But means-testing also has some serious drawbacks, especially when it comes to how the policy might shape Americans’ financial decisions. Means-testing entitlement benefits could punish the very people who work the hardest and save the most, depressing economic activity and discouraging good behavior. The cure for our fiscal problems could thus end up being worse than the disease. ….

There is an alternative approach — one that achieves many of the ends of traditional means-testing, but without inviting many of its drawbacks. The plan’s essential and distinguishing feature would involve limiting benefits based not on individuals’ incomes in retirement, but rather on their lifetime earnings. As noted above, Social Security already effectively does this, by paying proportionally lower benefits to people with higher average lifetime earnings. Today’s reformers could do the same, if to a greater degree.

For instance, the Social Security Administration already tabulates individuals’ average lifetime earnings as an intermediate step in calculating their retirement benefits. Reductions in Social Security or Medicare benefits, or increases in premiums, could be based upon this measure of average lifetime earnings rather than on income in retirement.

Unlike a strict means test, this approach would avoid creating powerful disincentives to save. Indeed, individuals facing lower Social Security benefits in retirement would have an incentive to save more during their working years to make up for the loss. ….

Incentives to work would still be undermined somewhat under such an approach. Reducing benefits based upon lifetime earnings would mean that, for each additional dollar an individual earns, the return through Social Security would be smaller. Thus, the “net tax rate” under Social Security — that is, the net value of taxes paid and benefits earned — would increase, and obviously higher tax rates discourage work.

But it is likely that these negative effects would be significantly smaller under a lifetime-earnings approach than under a traditional means test.

Andrew G. Biggs, “Means Testing and Its Limits“, National Affairs 9 (Fall 2011).

Universal benefits – without income or assets tests – provide the best incentives for citizens to work and save for old age. Andrew Biggs would agree, but claim that it is easier to levy implicit taxes (means tests) than explicit taxes, even when both fall disproportionately on the wealthiest citizens. I am not convinced.

The current issue of National Affairs also has articles by Bentley University economist Scott Sumner and by Chicago economist John H. Cochrane. Sumner’s essay, “Re-Targeting the Fed“, is a plea for the Fed to target nominal gross domestic product rather than inflation. Cochrane’s essay, “Inflation and Debt“, is a plea for fiscal austerity. “As a result of the federal government’s enormous debt and deficits”, Cochrane argues, “substantial inflation could break out in America in the next few years”.

Sumner’s proposal might be useful, since it would produce a somewhat more expansionary monetary policy. Fiscal austerity, though, is the last thing the United States needs when unemployment exceeds 9% and interest rates are very low. In my opinion, deflation is a greater risk than inflation in the US economy today.

HT Greg Mankiw, who agrees with me that there is no reason to worry about inflation at this moment.