Archive for the ‘Urban and Regional Economics’ Category

stimulus for manufacturing

Sunday, February 5th, 2012

Berkeley economist Christina Romer writes that there is no convincing reason for the United States government to single out its manufacturing sector for special treatment.

Everyone seems to be talking about a crisis in manufacturing. Workers, business leaders and politicians lament the decline of this traditionally central part of the American economy. President Obama, in his State of the Union address, singled out manufacturing for special tax breaks and support. Many go further, by urging trade restrictions or direct government investment in promising industries.

A successful argument for a government manufacturing policy has to go beyond the feeling that it’s better to produce “real things” than services. American consumers value health care and haircuts as much as washing machines and hair dryers. And our earnings from exporting architectural plans for a building in Shanghai are as real as those from exporting cars to Canada. ….

As an economic historian, I appreciate what manufacturing has contributed to the United States. It was the engine of growth that allowed us to win two world wars and provided millions of families with a ticket to the middle class. But public policy needs to go beyond sentiment and history. It should be based on hard evidence of market failures, and reliable data on the proposals’ impact on jobs and income inequality. So far, a persuasive case for a manufacturing policy remains to be made, while that for many other economic policies is well established.

Christina D. Romer, “Economic View: Do Manufacturers Need Special Treatment?“, New York Times, 5 February 2012.

Christina Romer was the chairwoman of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers. Read the entire column. It is excellent. I have excerpted only the first two paragraphs, and the conclusion.

Especially interesting to me was Ms Romer’s opinion that the benefits from clusters of manufacturing plants “while real, may often be small”. Paul Krugman, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of industrial clustering. See, for example, the paper he wrote two years ago for a meeting of the Association of American Geographers, or his recent defence of the auto bailout.

urban farms and the environment

Saturday, June 18th, 2011

Harvard economist Ed Glaeser explains that the local food movement does more harm than good to the environment.

There are many good reasons to like local food, but any large-scale metropolitan farming will do more harm than good to the environment. Devoting scarce metropolitan land to agriculture means lower density levels, longer drives, and carbon emission increases which easily offset the modest greenhouse gas reductions associated with shipping less food. ….

Shipping food is just far less energy intensive than moving people. If the First Lady [Michelle Obama] wants to help the environment, she should campaign for high rise apartments, rather than plant vegetables.

Edward L. Glaeser. “The locavore’s dilemma“, Boston Globe, 16 June 2011.

Professor Glaeser (born 1967) is author of Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier (Penguin Books, 2011). He writes a monthly column for the Boston Globe and blogs at Economix.

real estate prices in China

Saturday, March 12th, 2011

House prices in China have increased sharply, leading to concerns that a real estate bubble might be forming. The authors of a recent IMF Working Paper conclude that there is little evidence of a bubble and “the likelihood of financial instability precipitated by a housing price bust seems small”.

The main findings of the paper are:

  • First, on degree of price misalignment, we find that, as of mid-2010, house prices are not significantly overvalued in China as a whole. However, the mass-market segment in a number of coastal cities—but most clearly in Shanghai and Shenzhen—as well as a few inland cities may be in the early stages of excessive price growth. Early signs of price misalignment can also be detected in the luxury segment in Beijing and Nanjing.
  • Second, we find that over the past decade, when misalignments in house prices have occurred, they have been corrected relatively quickly. …. This constant correction of house prices is unlike the behavior observed in several industrial economies before 2008—especially the U.S., New Zealand, and France— ….
  • Third, the policy measures taken by the Chinese government in April 2010 appear to have had some impact on price growth. The gaps between market and fundamentals-implied prices have become smaller in a few cities. However, in a few cities, these market and policy measures do not seem to have been very effective in bringing prices back toward fundamentals. In particular, prices in the mass market segments in Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Shenzhen recently seem to have remained persistently misaligned.

Ahuja, Ashvin ; Cheung, Lillian ; Han, Gaofeng ; Porter, Nathaniel John ; Zhang, Wenlang, “Are House Prices Rising Too Fast in China?”, IMF Working Paper No. 10/274, 01 December 2010.

The authors are with the Asia-Pacific Department of International Monetary Fund (Ahuja and Porter) and the Research Department of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (Cheung, Han and Zhang).

The April 2010 measures of the Chinese government include increasing minimum down payment ratios for first and second home purchases, restoring the mortgage interest rate to 1.1 times the normal lending rate for second home purchases, rejecting  mortgage applications for the third purchase of a home, and suspending real estate sales to non-locals. These measures were timely and an important part of the reason for the upbeat assessment of these researchers.

The government is also considering implementation of property taxes on real estate. For advice on this, they need look no further than Hong Kong.

the fiscal system of Hong Kong

Thursday, March 10th, 2011

Hong Kong has no public debt. The government typically runs a surplus, and has accumulated fiscal reserves of HK$592 billion (US$76 billion) – equivalent to 34% of GDP, enough for nearly two years’ expenditure. The territory accomplishes this with low taxes. Hong Kong has no sales or value-added tax, no capital gains tax, no inheritance tax, and some of the lowest income and profits taxes in the world. High personal allowances exempt many workers from payment of tax on their salaries. The rest pay a maximum average rate of 16% (the same as the tax on business profits), with marginal rates that range from 2% to 17%. Low-income workers benefit not only from zero or minimal taxes, but also from housing subsidies (half of Hong Kong’s population lives in subsidised public flats).

David Pilling, Asia editor of the Financial Times, thinks that the apparent low taxes are an illusion. Hong Kong`s land policies, he writes, create “huge distortions and opacities, making it hard to talk sensibly about levels of tax and expenditure”.

The land system is a legacy of British colonialism. London wanted Hong Kong to be self-financing. So the colonial authorities raised money by leasing land, an apparently free source of revenue that persists to this day. The state hives off chunks of land in plots so large that only the biggest developers can bid for it. Developers also pay the government an upfront premium in return for permission to convert its use, say from agriculture to commercial, a hey-presto transformation that releases more value.

Civic Exchange [a Hong Kong think-tank] estimates no less than 45 per cent of government revenue comes from land, including land premiums, property rates and taxes on property developers’ handsome profits. Hemlock, the nom de plume of a business writer with close connections to Hong Kong’s tycoons, compares the property cartel that benefits from this arrangement to “feudal lords granted the right to gather tax from the peasants”. The tax in question is rent. Hong Kong’s is the highest in the world. According to DTZ, the property consultancy, the cost of office space in central Hong Kong pips that of even central London, Tokyo and Zurich.

Spiriting cash from land creates distortions. The top rate of income tax, at just 17 per cent, is legendarily low. But it turns out to be precisely that: a legend. Taxes are extracted, invisibly, via rent. There are also disguised expenditures. Take the MTR Corporation, which runs Hong Kong’s underground train system and airport express line. Such is the extent of the land holdings granted to it that some call MTR a property company with a train running through it. Land allocations require no legislative oversight. Nor are they accounted for as expenditure. By this means, Hong Kong has conjured a cheap and gleaming transport system seemingly out of nothing.

There are physical distortions, too. One is that half of Hong Kong’s citizens are herded into cramped government flats. Paying commercial rent or buying an apartment is quite beyond the reach of poor or even middle-class families, leaving them dependent on subsidised housing.

David Pilling, “Hong Kong’s land system that time forgot“, Financial Times, 10 March 2011.

Mr Pilling believes that Hong Kong land prices (hence commercial rents) are high because government charges for land use. If the land taxes and lease payments were removed, would the price of land fall? Only if the supply of land increases. But land – especially in tiny Hong Kong – is essentially fixed. Land can be reclaimed from the sea (as was done for the new Hong Kong airport), but this is very expensive. The burden of taxation of any factor in fixed supply falls entirely on those who control use of the factor, in this case the land developers. If the Hong Kong government were to end its policy of charging for land use, obtaining the lost revenue from a sales tax or higher income taxes, the prices and rents of commercial apartments and offices would not fall.

It is certainly true that looking only at data on taxation, rather than total government revenue or expenditure, distorts the fiscal picture of Hong Kong. But this does not imply that the revenue system of Hong Kong creates `”huge distortions”. Quite the contrary. Taxes on land create almost no distortions because they have no effect on supply or demand. For a full explanation, see any first-year economics text. It matters not a whit whether the revenue collected by government is called ‘lease payments’ or ‘tax payments’; the analysis is the same. Hong Kong should be praised – not condemned – for relying so heavily on land revenues to finance government expenditures.

the housing boom and bust

Tuesday, August 24th, 2010

The New York Times has an interesting article on the psychological effects of the bust that followed the recent housing boom.

“There is no iron law that real estate must appreciate,” said Stan Humphries, chief economist for the real estate site Zillow. “All those theories advanced during the boom about why housing is special — that more people are choosing to spend more on housing, that more people are moving to the coasts, that we were running out of usable land — didn’t hold up.”

Instead, Mr. Humphries and other economists say, housing values will only keep up with inflation. A home will return the money an owner puts in each month, but will not multiply the investment.

Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, [says] … “People shouldn’t look at a home as a way to make money because it won’t”. ….

For the first half of the 20th century, he [Yale economist Robert Shiller] said, … [h]ouses were seen the way cars are now: as a consumer durable that the buyer eventually used up.

The notion of housing as an investment first began to blossom after World War II, when the nesting urges of returning soldiers created a construction boom.

David Streitfeld, “Housing Fades as a Means to Build Wealth, Analysts Say”, New York Times, 23 August 2010.

the world’s most livable cities

Thursday, May 27th, 2010

[Austria's capital] recently beat out Zurich on the Mercer Human Resource Consulting list for the city with the best quality of life. This didn’t surprise the Viennese who are wont to say that Zurich is bigger than Vienna’s largest cemetery, but twice as boring. ….

[Mercer] seems to have a penchant for German-speaking towns, with Düsseldorf, Munich and Frankfurt joining Vienna and Zurich in its list of the top 10.

Mercer includes three English speaking cities in its top 10, Vancouver, Auckland and Sydney, with Geneva the only Francophone town.

…. The Economist Intelligence Unit picked Vancouver as its most livable city, with Vienna as No. 2. But the Economist clearly equates livability with speaking English. Vienna and Helsinki are the only two exceptions in the Economist’s top 10, the rest being Melbourne, Toronto, Calgary, Sydney, Perth, Adelaide and Auckland.

…. [N]either list has any cities in Asia, Africa, South America or the United States in the top 10. And no city in Britain made the grade either.

H.D.S. Greenway, “The Best Place to Live?”, International Herald Tribune, 27 May 2010.

Zipf’s Law and city size

Tuesday, April 20th, 2010

Harvard economist Edward L. Glaeser has an interesting post today on a law named after the linguist George Kinglsley Zipf. Zipf found that the frequency of any word in a text is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table. The same relationship has been observed in rankings unrelated to language, including the size distribution (population) of cities.

University of Minnesota economist Thomas Holmes and UBC economist Sanghoon Lee found, however, that Zipf’s Law does not hold for fixed geographical boundaries. In other words, Zipf’s Law for cities appears to result from urban sprawl rather than population density. Their work was published as “Cities as Six-by-Six-Mile Squares: Zipf’s Law?”, in the book Agglomeration Economics edited by Edward Glaeser (University of Chicago Press, 2010)

“Zipf’s Law” is one of the great curiosities of urban research. The law claims that the number of people in a city is inversely proportional to the city’s rank among all cities.  In other words, the biggest city is about twice the size of the second biggest city, three times the size of the third biggest city, and so forth. ….

But [researchers have shown that] Zipf’s Law seems to be mainly a product of city or metropolitan area boundaries, not the natural distribution of population.

Professors Holmes and Lee ignored political boundaries and split America up using a six-by-six-mile grid. Their cities are squares crafted without any attention to actual boundaries. Using Census Block level data, they calculate the population of each square in the grid. It turns out that Zipf’s Law doesn’t work for these fixed geographic areas.

Professors Holmes and Lee find that “for squares above 1,000 in population, a Zipf’s plot has a piecewise linear shape, with a kink at around a population of 50,000,” and “below the kink the slope is 0.75; above the kink, it is around 2.”

In other words, in dense areas population drops far more quickly with rank than Zipf’s Law would suggest, and in less dense areas, population drops off far too slowly to be compatible with Zipf’s Law. Zipf’s Law is a bust at describing the population levels of areas within fixed boundaries.

Edward L. Glaeser, “A Tale of Many Cities”, Economix, 20 April 2010.

Would the findings of Holmes and Lee apply also to countries of Asia and Europe, where cities have a denser core, with less urban sprawl? This topic should be added to someone’s research agenda.

A concern that I have with population statistics is that definitions of “city” are varied and arbitrary. Some cities include all surrounding suburbs – even rural farmland! – whereas others are restricted to an urban core, surrounded by suburbs. The approach of Holmes and Lee has the advantage that boundaries are fixed. The disadvantage is that it fails to distinguish a densely-populated square surrounded by densely-populated squares from one surrounded by empty squares.

geographers and economists

Saturday, April 17th, 2010

[O]ver much of the past three decades the methodologies of geographers and economists have been steadily diverging. …. [But] mainstream economics isn’t going away: like it or not, the White House has a Council of Economic Advisers, not a Council of Geographical Advisers, the World Bank hires lots of economists and not many geographers, and so on.

Paul Krugman, “The New Economic Geography, Now Middle-Aged”, Prepared for presentation to the Association of American Geographers, 16 April 16 2010.

migrating Chinese peasants

Sunday, November 29th, 2009

GMU economist Tyler Cowen has an interesting column on China in today’s New York Times.

Among other things, he refers to the migration of peasants from the countryside to urban factories:

Several hundred million Chinese peasants have moved from the countryside to the cities over the last 30 years, in one of the largest, most rapid migrations in history.

To help make this work, the Chinese government has subsidized its exporters by pegging the renminbi at an unnaturally low rate to the dollar.

Tyler Cowen, “Economic View: Dangers of an Overheated China”, New York Times, 29 November 2009.

The Chinese government has helped make this work also by keeping labour costs low with a hukou (household registration) system that was promulgated in January 1958 and is still in effect. The system allows the State to treat 150 million internal migrants as ‘guest workers’ in their own country. Immigrants from the countrysides have no right to permanent residence, and no claim on social benefits – not even public schooling for their children! In an unfortunate oversight, Cowen overlooked the hukou system when he drafted today’s column.

the Chinese hukou system

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

University of Washington geographer Kam Wing Chan has written a superb overview of China’s hukou (household registration) system that was promulgated in January 1958 and is still in effect. The system took away a basic right of Chinese citizens, the freedom to choose one’s place of residence. It discriminates against 800 million rural residents and allows the State to treat 150 million internal migrants as ‘guest workers’ in their own country.

The hukou system is often considered as unique to China. Although China’s system of controlling and regulating internal movements of its citizens is indeed far more elaborate than that in almost all other countries in the world, a broader survey reveals that a similar system existed or still exists in other (former) communist countries, such as the ho khau system in Vietnam and the hoju system in present-day North Korea. In fact, these migration control systems, the Chinese one included, owe much of their common origin to the propiska (internal passport) system utilized in the former USSR ….

What is unique about migration in China is that the two aspects of internal migration (movement and citizenship) can be totally disparate; i.e., one can move to a new place (for example, because of a job change) but can be permanently barred access to community membership-based services and welfare. People who have moved to a new place but do not possess local citizenship (hukou) are referred to as the non-hukou population, meaning that they are not de jure residents even though they are de facto residents. Conceptually, this is the group that has moved away from the location where their hukou is registered. The situation of Chinese migrants without citizenship, of course, is not unique in the international context of migration. Many so-called “guest laborers” working in foreign countries, sometimes for years, without local citizenship, fall into this category. But few countries have applied such a system to their own citizens in modern times. In China, this group is commonly called the “floating population” or “mobile population” (liudong renkou). Its size has grown rapidly from a few million in the early 1980s to the present level of about 150 million. ….

As I finish this retrospective on the Chinese hukou system at its semicentenary, it is my earnest wish that no one will have occasion to write on its centennial. The present version of the system is not deserving of such longevity.

Kam Wing Chan, “The Chinese Hukou System at 50″, Eurasian Geography and Economics 50:2 (March 2009), pp. 197-221.

Professor Chan is author of Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994).