Archive for the ‘Finance’ Category

“catastrophic austerity” in Greece and in Weimar Germany

Wednesday, February 8th, 2012

The Financial Times has published an interchange of letters responding to a single sentence that Martin Wolf included in his column last week. The sentence, referring to German insistence on fiscal discipline in vulnerable eurozone countries, is the following.

This attempt to vindicate the catastrophic austerity of Heinrich Brüning, German chancellor in 1930-1932, is horrifying.

Martin Wolf, “Europe is stuck on life support“, Financial Times, 1 February 2012.

The first letter writer supports Martin’s view that austerity and deflation was the proximate cause of the fall of the Weimar Republic.

Monetarist fetishists have helped to circulate a pernicious falsehood that the Weimar über-inflation caused the rise of Hitler. The wild inflation storm occurred in 1924. The Weimar economy recovered from it. The Nazis came to power only in 1933, as an immediate consequence of the deflationary spiral that resulted from what Mr Wolf refers to aptly as the “catastrophic austerity” introduced by Brüning.

Greece is now suffering from policies of similarly “catastrophic austerity”.

Anthony Murray, “Catastrophic austerity not über inflation gave us Hitler“, Financial Times, 6 February 2012.

The second letter writer asserts that the hyperinflation of 1924 was more important than the deflation of 1930-32 in ushering the Nazis into power in 1933.

No matter whether austerity today is catastrophic or not, to call Heinrich Brüning’s policies “the real reason for Germany’s descent into Nazism” (Letters, February 6) is a gross exaggeration. Although Brüning’s measures were disastrous, they were not very different from what other countries pursued during the Depression, mostly without turning into dictatorships. Germany’s descent began much earlier. ….

While we cannot draw a straight line from hyperinflation to the Machtergreifung by the Nazis, it is evident that the Weimar Republic never gained the broad-based democratic legitimacy needed to survive the Depression intact. Hyperinflation played an important part in that by destroying the faith of the middle class in the new regime.

Mark S. Manger, “Genesis of Nazism predates Brüning“, Financial Times, 8 February 2012.

No doubt both hyperinflation and austerity played a role. I have limited knowledge of recent German history, but timing seems to indicate that austerity was a more important factor in destroying German democratic institutions.

defining ‘Keynesian’

Tuesday, February 7th, 2012

Jonathan Portes argues that the label ‘Keynesian’ has become politicised, resulting in sterile political debate and needlessly high levels of unemployment. He describes three definitions of ‘Keynesian’.

Definition 1 is ‘anyone who doesn’t believe the Treasury View’, the doctrine that it is impossible for fiscal policy to affect aggregate demand “because the government needs to get the extra money from somewhere, whether through taxes or borrowing”. Mr Portes used to believe this, but no longer does. Nor does anyone else, so everyone is a Keynesian by this definition.

Definition 2 is “someone who believes that as an empirical matter, fiscal policy does have a substantial impact on aggregate demand; in contrast to those who believe that ‘Ricardian equivalence’ means that changes to government spending and borrowing will be substantially or wholly offset by changes to private sector spending and saving”.

Definition 3

So under Definitions 1 and 2 I’m a Keynesian, but then so is pretty much everyone else whom one would take seriously. The final definition, then, of a Keynesian, appears to be a much more ‘political’ one – someone who thinks that slowing fiscal consolidation would be a sensible policy decision in the current UK (or US) economic context. But this definition seems to me to be misconceived ….

[T]he main argument between those of us who favour slowing fiscal consolidation in the UK and those who think that this would be a dangerous mistake is not about whether the direct impact would be positive. It is whether the price of this direct positive impact would be ‘credibility’ with financial markets, and hence a damaging rise in long-term interest rates that would more than offset the gains.

I think this risk is hugely exaggerated, … but … this debate really has nothing to do with Keynes at all. It’s about a lot of things – how policymakers should deal with potential market irrationality, the role of the credit rating agencies, multiple equilibria, etc. But I don’t see that taking one side or the other of these arguments makes you a Keynesian (or not).

Jonathan Portes, “Fiscal policy: What does ‘Keynesian’ mean?“, Vox EU, 7 February 2012.

Jonathan Portes (born 1966) is director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, a London-based, independent research institute.

banks also suffer stigma

Friday, February 3rd, 2012

Many living in poverty fail to apply for government benefits because of stigma attached to them. You might think that banks do not feel similar shame. Think again. Germany’s largest bank, Deutsche, refuses to access cheap loans on offer from the European Central Bank (ECB) because this might damage its reputation. Josef Ackermann, the CEO we met yesterday (with video), claims that Deutsche Bank has “never taken any money from the government”. Presumably “government” includes the ECB.

Deutsche Bank does, however, shamelessly accept handouts when they are called “tax benefits” and don’t have to be repaid. The bank’s pre-tax loss of 351 million euros last quarter became net income of 186 million euros, thanks to a €537m tax benefit.

Perhaps if we labelled transfers to the poor “tax benefits”, or “negative income tax”, this would remove the stigma. It works for Deutsche Bank!

The ECB’s offer of … [unlimited three-year] loans to eurozone banks has been key to attempts by Mario Draghi, the central bank’s president, to ease market concerns over banks’ access to funding. In December, 523 eurozone banks took €489bn from the ECB in its first such offer and banks are widely expected to take part in a second chance to bid for funds this month.

Mr Draghi has said banks should see “no stigma” in using the ECB’s offer. Mr [Josef] Ackermann said Deutsche had not taken part in December and was reluctant to be seen as needing help. “The fact that we have never taken any money from the government has made us, from a reputational point of view, so attractive to so many clients in the world that we would be very reluctant to give that up,” Mr Ackermann told analysts on Thursday. ….

Mr Ackermann’s comments came as Deutsche Bank prepared for a change of leadership by making provisions for crisis-related lawsuits and writing down some corporate holdings, burdening its quarterly results. With the economic crisis also hitting investment banking profits, Deutsche reported a pre-tax loss of €351m, but net income of €186m after a tax benefit.

James Wilson, “Deutsche Bank concerned by offer of ECB loans“, Financial Times, 3 February 2012.

Banks are using the cheap ECB loans to purchase higher-yielding eurozone debt, so this is indirect aid to eurozone governments. But it is simultaneously aid to banks, which profit from the difference in interest rates.

banker warns of growing inequality

Friday, February 3rd, 2012

Swiss banker Josef Ackermann (born 1948) warns of a “social time bomb” from growing wealth and income inequality. He is CEO of Deutsche Bank and also heads the Institute of International Finance, an association of the world’s largest financial institutions.

Josef Ackermann … told the BBC that bankers had a responsibility to be philanthropic with their bonuses.

He is due to receive a partially deferred bonus [from Deutsche Bank] of 8m euros.

However, he said, he felt people in his position had to make a contribution.

“We have a social responsibility, because if this inequality increases in income distribution or wealth distribution we may have a social time bomb ticking and no-one wants to have that.”

However, Dr Ackermann said he “preferred not” to talk about philanthropic gestures.

Deutsche Bank chief Ackermann fears ‘social time bomb‘”, BBC News, 2 February 2012.

Ackermann is stepping down after a decade at the top of Germany’s largest bank. Deutsche Bank is not doing well. The bank posted a 4th quarter 2011 pretax loss of 351 million euros compared with a 707 million euro profit in the same quarter of 2010. Despite this loss, Ackermann will keep his 8 million euro bonus.

a theory of financial crisis

Monday, January 23rd, 2012

A former British academic argues that the current financial crisis happened because psychopaths, who lack a “conscience, have few emotions and display an inability to have any feelings, sympathy or empathy for other people”, took over the financial instructions.

It took a relatively obscure former British academic to propagate a theory of the financial crisis that would confirm what many people suspected all along: The “corporate psychopaths” at the helm of our financial institutions are to blame. ….

[Clive] Boddy argues in a recent issue of the Journal of Business Ethics [that] such people are “extraordinarily cold, much more calculating and ruthless towards others than most people are and therefore a menace to the companies they work for and to society.”

How do people with such obvious personality flaws make it to the top of seemingly successful corporations? Boddy says psychopaths take advantage of the “relative chaotic nature of the modern corporation,” including “rapid change, constant renewal” and high turnover of “key personnel.” Such circumstances allow them to ascend through a combination of “charm” and “charisma,” which makes “their behaviour invisible” and “makes them appear normal and even to be ideal leaders.”

William D. Cohan, “Did Psychopaths Take Over Wall Street Asylum?“, Bloomberg View, 2 January 2012.

Sounds reasonable to me.

HT: Michael Obersteiner

S&P defends rating actions

Sunday, January 15th, 2012

In a detailed memorandum, Standard & Poor’s analysts defend their decision to downgrade the debt of nine of the 16 eurozone sovereigns, and classify as negative the long-term outlook in all but two of them. Germany emerged in good health from Friday’s review, leaving it with the eurozone’s only stable AAA rating. S&P cut the AAA ratings of France and Austria to AA+. Finland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg retained their AAA ratings, but were placed on negative watch for the long-term.

Today’s rating actions are primarily driven by our assessment that the policy initiatives that have been taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In our view, these stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an increase in risk premiums for a widening group of eurozone issuers, (3) a simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and households, (4) weakening economic growth prospects, and (5) an open and prolonged dispute among European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges. ….

In our opinion, the political agreement [reached in the Dec. 9, 2011 EU summit] does not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to bolster European rescue operations ….

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness between the EMU’s core and the so-called “periphery”. As such, we believe that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers’ rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national tax revenues.

Anonymous, “Factors Behind Our Rating Actions On Eurozone Sovereign Governments“, Standard & Poor’s, Frankfurt, 13 January 2012, 17:28 EST.

HT: The Browser

The third stress – “a simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and households” – is especially important. Translated into plain English, this refers to attempts by governments and households to reduce spending and pay off their debts. From this it follows that “fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls …, eroding national tax revenues”.

Remember. A rating agency is concerned solely with risk of default – the inability or unwillingness of an issuer of bonds to keep its promises. The pain and suffering that fiscal austerity might mean for the general public is not taken into account. Recession is relevant only insofar as it makes it difficult for a country to meet its debt obligations.

back to the gold standard

Thursday, January 12th, 2012

In today’s instalment of the FT series “Capitalism in Crisis”, Malaysian politician Mahathir Mohamad blames the crisis on currency speculation. He would like to ban currency trading, and calls on the international community to create a new international currency based on gold.

In Hong Kong in 1997 I spoke at the meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and I blamed the financial crisis in east Asia on currency trading. I told them currencies were not commodities and should not be traded. But the World Bank and IMF did not care. They even accorded currency traders … rights ….

I was condemned for my criticism of currency trading. But the exploitation and abuses of the financial market could not last forever. In 2008 the bubble burst. Banks, insurance companies, investment funds and even countries went bankrupt. But for its position as the currency for trade settlements, the dollar would be worth almost nothing. ….

A new “Bretton Woods” should be convened with adequate representation from the poor countries. It should consider a trading currency based on gold, against which all other currencies should be valued. …. Governments should fix the exchange rate based on gold or economic performances. There should be no trading in currencies.

Mahathir Mohamad, “West needs to go back to capitalist basics“, Financial Times, 12 January 2012.

If this column had been written by someone less famous, it is doubtful that the FT would have published it. In my opinion, the entire essay is rubbish, except for a short paragraph near the end, where Mahathir calls for better regulation of banks, “to prevent excessive leveraging, limit loans and stop subprime lending”.

Mahathir Mohamad (born 1925) was a medical doctor before his election to parliament in 1964. He was prime minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003.

capitalists and markets

Wednesday, January 11th, 2012

The FT series “Capitalism in Crisis” continues today with two more essays. The first is by Vikram Pandit, CEO of Citigroup. Mr Pandit writes what you might expect the CEO of a major financial institution to write. The fact that governments had to come to the rescue of banks in 2007 and 2008 is not evidence of failure of the financial system, only “specific failures by certain participants in the financial system”. What is needed, Mr Pandit suggests, is greater transparency, to sweep away “some of the obscurity that causes people to believe the system is a game rigged against their interests”.

Really? Would more information (greater transparency) cause taxpayers to welcome the use of public money to rescue failing financial firms? I doubt it.

The second essay is much better. In it, FT columnist John Kay explains that this debate is really about the market economy, not about ownership of capital. The debate is not about capitalism, because capitalism no longer exists. In Karl Marx’s lifetime, capitalism described the system of individual ownership of machinery and factories that made the industrial revolution possible. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this system evolved into something very different.

The political and economic environment in which Marx wrote was a brief interlude in economic history. …. Legislation passed in Marx’s time permitted the establishment of the limited liability company, which made it possible to build businesses with widely dispersed share ownership. This form of organisation did not become popular until the end of the 19th century, but then expanded rapidly. By the 1930s, Berle and Means would write of the divorce of ownership and control. At the same time, Alfred Sloan at General Motors demonstrated how a cadre of professional managers might wield effective control over a large and diversified corporation.

So the business leaders of today are not capitalists in the sense in which [Richard] Arkwright and [John D.] Rockefeller were capitalists. Modern titans derive their authority and influence from their position in a hierarchy, not their ownership of capital. They have obtained these positions through their skills in organisational politics, in the traditional ways bishops and generals acquired positions in an ecclesiastical or military hierarchy. ….

Sloppy language leads to sloppy thinking. By continuing to use the 19th-century term capitalism for an economic system that has evolved into something altogether different, we are liable to misunderstand the sources of strength of the market economy and the role capital plays within it.

John Kay, “Let’s talk about the market economy“, Financial Times, 11 January 2012.

John Kay’s column is ungated at the link above. You can also access it here.

global banking and the crisis of 2007-??

Tuesday, January 10th, 2012

The FT series on “Capitalism in Crisis” continues. Today, associate editor John Gapper looks at global banking, “where the crisis emerged and where its heart still lies”.

In the 1990s and 2000s, banks became a leading force in western economies. Their share of gross domestic product rose sharply; Wall Street banks such as Goldman Sachs extended their reach across Europe and Asia; the boundaries between commercial and investment banking were eroded, and bankers were highly rewarded and even regarded as glamorous.

Today, they are resented for holding taxpayers hostage by having become “too big to fail”. Many argue that banks have drifted from their basic social function – to encourage growth by making loans, underwriting securities and advising companies – into a self-interested drive to make money by any means possible. ….

Unless they can find a way to demonstrate their usefulness clearly, and to curb the practices that most alienate outsiders, banks face a long, debilitating trench war against new regulation. For economies, this could limit the beneficial aspects of a thriving and focused financial sector.

John Gapper, “Promises that proved ultimately empty“, Financial Times, 10 January 2012.

the falling euro

Saturday, January 7th, 2012

Last year the euro, defying predictions, was very strong against the US dollar. In the first week of 2012 it fell to US$1.27, slightly lower than it was a year ago, and well below its peak of US$1.48 on 4 May 2012. Will it continue to fall, or will it recover? I have no idea, so outsource this query to the very competent and always sensible Lex team of the Financial Times.

Explaining currency moves in a $4,000bn-a day market is a question of spinning a simple yarn to fit events that have already happened, rather than predicting them. The story’s momentum is established as more participants hear it, embellish it and retell it. Then it begins to become self-fulfilling. So now with the euro’s slide.

How low can the euro go? Strategists’ forecasts for this year range from the currency climbing back above $1.35 against the dollar to a drop to $1.10.

The euro is still above the fair value of $1.25 implied by purchasing power parity – and it has been so ever since its recovery from its disastrous early years. A move well below $1.25, if not quite to $1.10, looks more likely if the US recovery story suggested by Friday’s unexpectedly strong jobs data gains traction.

Lex, “Dollar: how low can the euro go?”, Financial Times, 7 January 2012.


Well, market strategists disagree, and the Lex team carefully hedges its bet on a falling euro. I still have no clue as to the future exchange rate of the euro against the dollar. If 2012 is anything like 2011, we should see a rise in the first four or five months, then a fall in the last four months of the year. But there is no reason to expect past patterns to repeat in the future.