Archive for the ‘Development Economics’ Category

greed and the market economy

Wednesday, January 18th, 2012

FT columnist John Kay has written another superb essay, comparing greed in market economies with greed in command economies.

North Korea is hardly free of the profit motive. The Kim dynasty and the cliques around it may profess disdain for capitalism, but they understand the goal of personal enrichment as well as any Wall Street Master of the Universe. The difference between North Korea and the US is not that one society offers more scope for greed than the other. In both countries, as in many others, there are greedy people and many who are not, and those who are greedy are disproportionately represented in the controlling elite. The difference lies in the channels of greed – the degree to which the quest for profit is directed towards the creation of new wealth rather than the appropriation of wealth already created by other people.

A successful market economy emphasises the former and restricts the latter through rules and institutions, in a structure that has evolved slowly and requires constant defence against those who would use economic and political power to subvert it. Success or failure in that endeavour is the central explanation for why some societies are rich and others poor. Crony capitalism is very different from the market economy.

John Kay, “A real market economy ensures that greed is good“, Financial Times, 18 January 2012,

That is an ungated link. The gated column is available here.

poverty and development

Friday, January 6th, 2012

LSE economist Timothy Besley reviews three recent books that showcase microeconomic advances in the study of poverty. Besley praises all three, in part because the “authors make extensive use of vignettes — an unusual move for economists — ­introducing readers by name to real people whose stories illustrate broader concepts”. But he is concerned that this bottom-up approach neglects politics. “After all, some of the greatest successes in raising living standards have come about not by altering individuals’ choices but by altering decisions made by governments.”

Besley calls on researchers to pay more attention to politics. This is quite a challenge since – by his own admission – so far the top-down approach has contributed little or nothing to our understanding of how to transform corrupt governments into developmental states.

Over the past 25 years, the greater use of microdata to generate insights into decision-making and societal constraints has transformed development economics. Scholars know far more than ever before about who the poor are, how they behave, and the constraints they face. But another major innovation in development economics gets little attention in these three books: an increasing focus on political factors in shaping development. ….

One place to look for lessons is in China. Over the past three decades, the country has grown remarkably quickly — achieving, in the process, what is probably the largest reduction in mass poverty the world has ever seen. ….

[For many reasons], the Chinese model is not an easy or attractive model for other countries to follow as they seek to build effective states and thereby reduce poverty. Yet the western European model is problematic, too, since up until World War II, it emerged largely out of the need to fight countless wars. ….

In fact, no one really knows how to get a state to start recognizing and addressing the core needs of its population.

Timothy Besley, “Poor Choices: Poverty From the Ground Level“, Foreign Affairs 91:1 (January/February 2012).

Timothy Besley (born 1961) is co-author, with Torsten Persson, of Pillars of Prosperity (Princeton University Press, 2011). In this essay, he is reviewing Poor Economics, by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo (Public Affairs, 2011); More Than Good Intentions, by Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel (Dutton Adult, 2011); and Portfolios of the Poor, by Daryl Collins, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford, and Orlanda Ruthven (Princeton University Press, 2010).

Daron Acemoglu on the Arab Spring

Friday, September 30th, 2011

MIT economist Daron Acemoglu has a long interview in the current issue of The Region, a quarterly publication of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve.

This portion of the interview caught my eye. It was in response to the question “I wonder if you could share any thoughts you’ve had about how that research [with James Robinson] applies to the Arab Spring.”

The big question is, Is this going to be a political revolution in the same way as the Glorious Revolution in England, which unleashed a fundamental process of transformation in the political system with associated economic changes? Ultimately, such political revolutions are fundamental to the growth of nations. That’s one of the arguments we make.

Or is it going to be the sort of revolution like the Bolshevik Revolution or the independence movements in much of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s, where there was a change in political power, but it went from one group to another, which then re-created the same system and started the same sort of exploitative process as the previous one?

Douglas Clement, Interview with Daron Acemoglu, The Region (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), September 2011.

Daron Acemoglu (born 1967) is a Turkish economist of Armenian origin. He is co-author (with James Robinson) of Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Why Nations Fail: Origins of Power, Poverty and Prosperity (forthcoming, Crown, 2012).

Acemoglu, though brilliant, is surprisingly humble. Douglas Clement, in the interview, recalls “In 2009, you [Acemoglu] gave a presentation at the International Monetary Fund/World Bank in which you answered the question, What should we do about the financial crisis? with a three-word answer: I don’t know.”

the economics of emigration

Monday, August 22nd, 2011

Another article worthy of note in the current issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives is a nicely-written, concise survey of the economics of emigration.

The gains from eliminating migration barriers dwarf … the gains from eliminating other types of barriers. For the elimination of trade policy barriers and capital flow barriers, the estimated gains amount to less than a few percent of world GDP. For labor mobility barriers, the estimated gains are often in the range of 50–150 percent of world GDP.

In fact, existing estimates suggest that even small reductions in the barriers to labor mobility bring enormous gains. …. A conservative reading of the evidence …suggests that the emigration of less than 5 percent of the population of poor regions would bring global gains exceeding the gains from total elimination of all policy barriers to merchandise trade and all barriers to capital flows. For comparison, currently about 200 million people—3 percent of the world—live outside their countries of birth. ….

The departure of some [skilled] people … from a poor country might reduce the productivity of others in that country. Such an effect would tend to offset the gains from emigration. Externalities like these are often assumed to be so pervasive that the literature refers to skilled migration with a pejorative catchphrase—“brain drain”—embodying the assumption. (To see why economists should avoid this term, picture reading a journal article on female labor force participation that calls it the “family abandonment rate.”) ….

[Economist have published 13 times as many journal articles on "international trade" as on "international migration", and the migration papers are] focused … more on the relatively small and uncertain effects of remittances and “brain drain” than on the relatively massive and likely global effects of migration—including the benefits for the migrants themselves? …. [Why?] Perhaps the literature focuses on remittances and “brain drain” because those effects more obviously pertain to national welfare than individual welfare.

Michael A. Clemens, “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?“, Journal of Economic Perspectives 25:3 (Summer 2011), pp. 83-106.

Obsession with national welfare, Clemens writes, is “a grand old tradition in economics”, one that dates from the mercantilists, who wrote long before Adam Smith. Modern economists – despite Adam Smith’s unfortunate use of the term “Wealth of Nations” in the title of his famous book – are supposed to be concerned with individual welfare rather than the wealth or power of nations. (We now leave analysis of the latter to political scientists.)

Michael Clemens is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Washington, D.C. research institute, where he leads the Migration and Development initiative.

Access to current and back issues of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, published quarterly by the American Economic Association, does not require a subscription or AEA membership. JEP articles are less technical than those of other AEA journals, and are intended for readers who have either completed an undergraduate principles course, or have an equivalent understanding of economics.

“brain drain”

Sunday, August 21st, 2011

Two economists – John Gibson (University of Waikato, New Zealand) and David McKenzie (Development Research Group, World Bank) – have teamed up to draft an excellent ‘state of the art’ paper on migration of professionals and skilled workers. They pose (and answer) eight questions that underly the “brain drain” debate.

The term “brain drain” dominates popular discourse on high-skilled migration, and for this reason, we use it in this article. However, as Harry Johnson noted, it is a loaded phrase implying serious loss. It is far from clear that such a loss actually occurs in practice; indeed, there is an increasing recognition of the possible benefits that skilled migration can offer both for migrants and for sending countries. This paper builds upon a recent wave of empirical research to answer eight key questions underlying much of the brain drain debate: 1) What is brain drain? 2) Why should economists care about it? 3) Is brain drain increasing? 4) Is there a positive relationship between skilled and unskilled migration? 5) What makes brain drain more likely? 6) Does brain gain exist? 7) Do high-skilled workers remit, invest, and share knowledge back home? 8 ) What do we know about the fiscal and production externalities of brain drain?

Here is a brief summary of their answers:

Brain drain rates are not skyrocketing. Africa is not the most affected region for brain drain; small island states are. Most skilled migrants are not doctors. But neither are they taxi drivers. Skilled individuals enjoy massive increases in living standards as a result of migrating. The rise in skilled migration does not appear to be crowding out migration opportunities for unskilled migrants: instead, skilled and unskilled migration have increased together. Skilled migrants are remitting back about as much as the fifi scal cost of their absence. Existing preliminary estimates of the production externalities associated with brain drain are quite small.

John Gibson and David McKenzie, “Eight Questions about Brain Drain“, Journal of Economic Perspectives 25:3 (Summer 2011), pp. 107–128.

Details are in the full article (access is not restricted). The authors conclude by posing and leaving “for further research five more questions for which answers are needed to better understand the overall impacts of high-skilled migration”.

The Gibson/McKenzie survey is part of a three-article Symposium on migration in the current issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. The other two articles are “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk?”, by Michael A. Clemens, and “Migrant Remittances”, by Dean Yang.

genetic diversity and economic development

Tuesday, August 2nd, 2011

I always thought that genetic diversity – a large gene pool – is unambiguously a good thing. Two economists in new research find that this assumption is wrong: genetic homogeneity is bad, but too much diversity is equally bad. The relationship, they show, is “hump-shaped” (an inverted-U). There is an an optimal amount of diversity that maximizes economic development and growth.

The paper provides empirical support for the hypothesis, with data from half a millennium ago (1500 CE: population density is the macroeconomic outcome) and from modern times (2000 CE: per capita income is the macroeconomic outcome).

This research argues that deep-rooted factors, determined tens of thousands of years ago, had a significant effect on the course of economic development from the dawn of human civilization to the contemporary era. It advances and empirically establishes the hypothesis that, in the course of the exodus of Homo sapiens out of Africa, variation in migratory distance from the cradle of humankind to various settlements across the globe affected genetic diversity and has had a long-lasting effect on the pattern of comparative economic development that is not captured by geographical, institutional, and cultural factors. In particular, the level of genetic diversity within a society is found to have a hump-shaped effect on development outcomes in both the pre-colonial and the modern era, reflecting the trade-off between the beneficial and the detrimental effects of diversity on productivity. While the intermediate level of genetic diversity prevalent among Asian and European populations has been conducive for development, the high degree of diversity among African populations and the low degree of diversity among Native American populations have been a detrimental force in the development of these regions.

Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor, “The ‘Out of Africa’ Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development” NBER Working Paper 17216 (July 2011).

Ashraf is a member of the faculty of Williams College; Galor is a professor at Brown University.

Food for thought. Reading this paper, though, I cannot help but wonder if the authors might reach different conclusions if they looked at development outcomes in America prior to the arrival of Europeans. The macroeconomic outcomes of the civilisations of the Aztecs, Mayas and Incas were impressive, despite their low levels of genetic diversity. Contact with Europeans was devastating for the health, culture and general well-being of native populations in the Americas, despite the beneficial effect of a larger gene pool.

Update: I have printed this 96-page paper, will read it with care, and report back. There is a wealth of material in the appendices (pp. 44-96) that I have not yet read. It is possible that the authors address my concern there.

Another caveat: Could the findings be spurious correlation? Another paper, using a very different explanatory variable, found it to have an inverted-U relationship with development outcomes, performing in much the same way as the genetic diversity variable.

size matters

Wednesday, July 20th, 2011

This paper explores the link between economic development and penile length between 1960 and 1985. It estimates an augmented Solow model utilizing the Mankiw-Romer-Weil 121 country dataset. The size of male organ is found to have an inverse U-shaped relationship with the level of GDP in 1985. It can alone explain over 15% of the variation in GDP. The GDP maximizing size is around 13.5 centimetres, and a collapse in economic development is identified as the size of male organ exceeds 16 centimetres. Economic growth between 1960 and 1985 is negatively associated with the size of male organ, and it alone explains 20% of the variation in GDP growth. With due reservations it is also found to be more important determinant of GDP growth than country’s political regime type. Controlling for male organ slows convergence and mitigates the negative effect of population growth on economic development slightly. Although all evidence is suggestive at this stage, the `male organ hypothesis’ put forward here is robust to exhaustive set of controls and rests on surprisingly strong correlations.

Tatu Westling, “Male Organ and Economic Growth: Does Size Matter?“, Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER), Discussion Paper No. 335, July 2011.

That is the abstract of this paper, which is technically well done. The paper is not a hoax, but I suspect that the author may have written it tongue-in-cheek, as a criticism of econometric regressions of GDP and GDP growth on all manner of variables.

Tatu Westling is an economist listed in the staff directory of the Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki.

Mr Westling has one other publication listed in the university archives: his Master’s Thesis, with a less exciting title (“Local network externalities and market dynamics: an agent-based computational economics approach”, 27 August 2006).

avoiding economic bust in Brazil

Friday, July 8th, 2011

How might Brazil keep its economy moving? A Financial Times editorialist explores the options.

Brazil’s economy is like a bicycle. It works so long as it keeps moving. This has been easy over the past decade. High commodity prices have boosted the value of Brazilian exports. Ample credit has meanwhile kept the domestic economy zooming. Now, however, the cycling is getting harder. ….

One way for the Brazilian bicycle to keep moving is to get the exchange rate down. But Brazil has already tried partial capital controls and massive currency intervention; neither have worked. Another is to cool internal demand by cutting wasteful government spending: Brazil should be running budget surpluses now instead of deficits. But getting spending cuts through Congress has proved very hard. A third alternative is to raise taxes on the commodity sector.

There is no easy solution. Even better-run, commodity-rich economies, such as Chile or Australia, are suffering. But in Brazil the problems are writ larger because its economy is so much bigger. The Brazilian bicycle is not yet in danger of stopping. But it is wobbling.

Brazil’s currency war wounds“, Financial Times, 8 July 2011.

The editorialist fails to mention this, but – because of lax border controls – the third alternative is also very difficult. Brazilian exporters evaded taxes and exchange controls in the past by shipping huge quantities of coffee and soybeans illegally via Paraguay. Unless its system of tax collection improves, along with better control of spending, Brazil could return to a traditional ‘stop-go’ pattern of growth and inflation. That would be tragic. Hopefully, Brazil can get its fiscal house in order in time to avert an economic disaster.

lest we forget

Tuesday, July 5th, 2011

Arnold Kling reminds us that this is how NYU economist Bill Easterly declared independence:

Unfortunately, with some exceptions, multilateral and bilateral agencies had incentives to continue lending even when recipient government actions destroyed any hope of economic growth. Sometimes donors and multilaterals gave aid and loans only because the function of donors and multilateral agencies is to give aid and loans. Sometimes aid lenders gave loans to enable old aid loans to be repaid. Sometimes donors gave aid because the recipient countries were political allies of the donor countries. Recipient governments promised the multilateral agencies that this time they would reform, like alcoholics promising never to drink again.

William Easterly, “The failure of development“, Financial Times, 4 July 2001.

It was for writing this, that he was fired from the World Bank.

Brazil’s coming economic bust

Tuesday, July 5th, 2011

Brazil’s currency, fuelled by capital inflows, is trading at a 12-year high against the dollar. The strong real reduces the competitiveness of the country’s manufacturing sector and is a major headache for President Dilma Rousseff.

Brazil’s rapid economic growth and high real interest rates at nearly 6 per cent make its markets a powerful draw for foreign investors starved of investment opportunities in developed markets.

“US interest rates are near zero, UK interest rates are near zero, Japanese rates are near zero and Brazilian rates are 12.25 per cent – I would say that’s the crux of the matter,” said Neil Shearing of Capital Economics in London.

Joe Leahy, “Brazil fears economic fallout as real soars“, Financial Times, 2 July 2011.

Equally troubling for Brazil’s economy is the huge amount of outstanding consumer debt serviced at interest rates that average 47%. That is not a typo: consumer interest rates on average are currently 47%, while the benchmark interest rate is 12.25% and annual inflation is about 6%. Two hedge fund managers, writing in the Financial Times, call attention to this “astronomical and rising” consumer debt burden.

The consumer debt service burden, which stood at 24 per cent of disposable income in 2010, is now slated to rise to 28 per cent in 2011. ….

We calculate that the debt service burden for the so-called “middle class” in Brazil has now breached 50 per cent of disposable income, as high income earners have little need to borrow at rates which are punitive and most of the consumer credit is therefore being directed to the “middle class” for consumption.

The strain is already evident among the smaller banks, which are finding it difficult to access funding. The central bank has now rescued or taken over three banks in distress over the past six months.

Meanwhile, delinquencies in Brazil (defaults in excess of 15 days) have begun to move up rapidly, from 7.8 per cent to 9.1 per cent of total loans between December 2010 and May 2011. Delinquencies are now rising at a very hectic rate. They have risen at 23 per cent in the first five months of this year in absolute terms or at an annualised rate of 55 per cent.

Paul Marshall and Amit Rajpal, “Brazil risks tumbling from boom to bust“, Financial Times, 5 July 2011.