Archive for July, 2010

Alan Greenspan

Saturday, July 31st, 2010

In extremis, he says, banks might have to be broken up by law if they become too big to fail without bringing down the whole financial system. But he makes clear that he regards such an intervention as a last resort. He retains faith in markets and doesn’t even think that US-style finance capitalism will lose ground to the softer, more regulated model of European social democracy, let alone the appeal of a centrally planned economy such as the former Soviet Union. It is a question of making precise technocratic adjustments.

Alan Beattie, “Lunch with the FT: Alan Greenspan”, Financial Times, 31 July 2010.

Alan Greenspan, age 84, retired from the Federal Reserve, but not from work. “Even when he was Fed chairman, he still spent at least half his day in personal study. Now, with his central banking career over, he has gone straight back to what he did before, running a research operation with a handful of employees.”

the business of central banks

Friday, July 30th, 2010

[Central Bank origins] usually were remote from control of inflation or output or anything resembling modern macroeconomic policy. The Bank of England was established in 1694 by a group of City merchants lending money to finance the wars of William III. Even the US Federal Reserve, which was founded much later in 1913 in response to the bank crisis of 1907, was primarily concerned with the stability of the commercial banks. In the 19th century rough price stability was expected to result from using gold as the ultimate form of money. The role of the central bank was to ensure that, despite any paper money or other credit instruments issued by governments, the gold convertibility of the currency was maintained. In the course of the 20th century the gold link was … cut. Thus central banks were left by default with the task of maintaining the value of the currency. Even then many were just as concerned with the welfare of commercial banks and the financial system as a whole.

How have they performed in their enlarged role? At a cursory glance, none too well. So far from curbing the notorious German hyperinflation of the 1920s, the then head of the Reichsbank plaintively observed that he was printing money as fast as the machinery at his disposal allowed. At the Bank of England, governor Montagu Norman bullied Winston Churchill into returning to gold in 1925 at an overvalued parity, which helped trigger the General Strike the following year. Later he prevented the 1929-31 Labour government from embarking on public works to counter rising unemployment. Worst of all was the unwillingness or inability of the Fed to prevent a massive decline in the US money stock at the onset of the Depression.

There followed a gap of several decades in which central banks were demoted. But it can hardly be said that they have achieved distinction in more recent years.

Samuel Brittan, “Take central banks down a notch”, Financial Times, 30 July 2010.

In a few days or so, an ungated version of this column should appear here.

on death and dying

Wednesday, July 28th, 2010

Another great health care article by Dr Atul Gawande.

The subject [of health care for the terminally ill] seems to reach national awareness mainly as a question of who should “win” when the expensive decisions are made: the insurers and the taxpayers footing the bill or the patient battling for his or her life. Budget hawks urge us to face the fact that we can’t afford everything. Demagogues shout about rationing and death panels. Market purists blame the existence of insurance: if patients and families paid the bills themselves, those expensive therapies would all come down in price. But they’re debating the wrong question. The failure of our system of medical care for people facing the end of their life runs much deeper. ….

In 2008, the national Coping with Cancer project published a study showing that terminally ill cancer patients who were put on a mechanical ventilator, given electrical defibrillation or chest compressions, or admitted, near death, to intensive care had a substantially worse quality of life in their last week than those who received no such interventions. And, six months after their death, their caregivers were three times as likely to suffer major depression. Spending one’s final days in an I.C.U. because of terminal illness is for most people a kind of failure. You lie on a ventilator, your every organ shutting down, your mind teetering on delirium and permanently beyond realizing that you will never leave this borrowed, fluorescent place. The end comes with no chance for you to have said goodbye or “It’s O.K.” or “I’m sorry” or “I love you.” ….

The hard question we face … is not how we can afford this system’s expense. It is how we can build a health-care system that will actually help dying patients achieve what’s most important to them at the end of their lives. ….

Like many people, I had believed that hospice care hastens death, because patients forgo hospital treatments and are allowed high-dose narcotics to combat pain. But studies suggest otherwise. …. The lesson seems almost Zen: you live longer only when you stop trying to live longer.

Atul Gawande, “Letting Go”, The New Yorker, 2 August 2010.

HT Clive Crook.

Atul Gawande (1965-) is a journalist, a staff surgeon at Brigham and Women’s Hospital (Boston), Associate Professor of Surgery at Harvard Medical School and Associate Professor in the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Harvard School of Public Health.

We are not getting any younger. Death is certain, even if its timing is not. You will benefit from reading Gawande’s long essay, and also – in case you missed it – a recent essay by another author, on the same subject:

Katy Butler, “What Broke My Father’s Heart”, New York Times Sunday Magazine, 20 June 2010.

US taxes

Tuesday, July 27th, 2010

I find it astounding that in 2009, the total revenue from the income tax, at 6.4 per cent of GDP was almost identical to the revenue from social security receipts, at 6.3 per cent. If this were my country, I would find that scandalous, given the latter are so much more regressive (and job destroying) than the former. But it is not. I merely point it out.

Martin Wolf, responding to comments at Martin Wolf’s Exchange, 27 July 2010.

Martin Wolf on austerity in the long run

Monday, July 26th, 2010

Martin Wolf, following a week-long austerity debate, looks at fiscal deficits in the USA and predicts they will explode. “This matters for the US and, because the US remains the world’s most important economy, it also matters greatly for the world.” Martin’s forecast is depressing, but realistic and probable. The only hope might be to replace the Republicans with a conservative and fiscally responsible party to oppose the Democrats, but tax cuts are popular, so this will not happen.

My reading of contemporary Republican thinking is that there is no chance of any attempt to arrest adverse long-term fiscal trends should they return to power. Moreover, since the Republicans have no interest in doing anything sensible, the Democrats will gain nothing from trying to do much either. That is the lesson Democrats have to draw from the Clinton era’s successful frugality, which merely gave George W. Bush the opportunity to make massive (irresponsible and unsustainable) tax cuts. In practice, then, nothing will be done. ….

[W]ith one party indifferent to deficits, provided they are brought about by tax cuts, and the other party relatively fiscally responsible (well, everything is relative, after all), but opposed to spending cuts on core programmes, US fiscal policy is paralysed.

Martin Wolf, “The political genius of supply-side economics”, Martin Wolf’s Exchange, 25 July 2010.

Read the entire post. It is not gated – neither registration nor subscription is needed to access Martin Wolf’s Exchange.

the FT austerity debate continues

Saturday, July 24th, 2010

Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank, made a predictable (and dull) call for austerity in his invited contribution to the FT debate on this subject. Deficit spending, he concedes, was necessary to avert “a financial meltdown and a second Great Depression”, but enough of that. Now it is time to restore fiscal balance and concentrate on ensuring price stability:

The ECB, which acted at the very start of the financial turmoil on August 9 2007, will contribute to consolidate a confident economic environment by ensuring price stability in the euro area as we have done for more than a decade. We expect governments to confirm their determination to consolidate their public finances.

Jean-Claude Trichet, “Stimulate no more – it is now time for all to tighten”, Financial Times, 23 July 2010.

Berkeley economist Brad DeLong responds to Trichet in the FT weekend edition, with prose that is lively and entertaining.

What lessons does history have to teach us about Jean-Claude Trichet’s call for immediate, rapid, and substantial fiscal and monetary retrenchment and austerity–about his full-throated endorsement of the agenda of the Pain Caucus?

Well, history tells us that there are times and circumstances when countries’ refusal to listen to calls for retrenchment and austerity has led to economic disaster. Times when a country’s supply of savings is inelastic and more government borrowing leads to sharp rises in and high real interest rates are times in which government budget deficits have drained the pool of savings, reduced private investment, and slowed growth–as they did in the U.S. in the second Reagan and the first Bush administration. Times when monetary and fiscal laxity leads to an expectation that government debt will be monetized and to rapid rises in inflation expectations are times in which policy has made a deep recession to restore price stability inevitable–as happened in the U.S. in the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. And times when irrational exuberance on the part of foreign investors leads a country’s public or private sector to borrow heavily in foreign currency, it needs to pre-emptively retrench before foreign investor exuberance wears off, or else–as happened to East Asia in 1997-8, to Mexico in 1994-5, or to Argentina innumerable times since 1890.

Brad DeLong,  “Trichet rejects the counsels of history”, Financial Times, 24 July 2010.

You can access the rest of the statement at ft.com, or view an ungated version at Brad DeLong’s blog, where he complains that the Financial Times deleted the first two paragraphs. Here are the deleted paragraphs:

One of the embarrassing dirty little secrets of economics is that there is no such thing as economic theory properly so-called. There is simply no set of foundational bedrock principles on which one can base calculations that illuminate situations in the real world. Biologists know that every cell runs off instructions for protein synthesis encoded in its DNA. Chemists start with what the Heisenberg and Pauli principles plus the three-dimensionality of space tell us about stable electron configurations. Physicists start with the four fundamental forces of nature. Economists have none of that. The “economic principles” underpinning their theories are a fraud–not bedrock truths but mere knobs twiddled and tunes so that the right conclusions come out of the analysis.

What are the “right” conclusions? It depends on what type of economist you are, for there are two types. One type chooses, for non-economic and non-scientific reasons, a political stance and a political set of allies, and twiddles and tunes their assumptions until they come out with conclusions that please their allies and their stance. The other type takes the carcass of history, throws it into the pot, turns up the heat, and boils it down, hoping that the bones and the skeleton that emerge will teach lessons and suggest principles that will be useful to voters, bureaucrats, and politicians as they try to guide our civilization as it slouches toward utopia. (You will not be surprised to learn that I think that only this second kind of economist has any use at all.)

Brad DeLong, “Jean-Claude Trichet Rejects the Counsels of History”, Grasping Reality with Both Hands, 23 July 2010.

Why were these paragraphs deleted? FT editors would no doubt argue that space constraints required it. This was the argument of OECD editors who, a decade ago, deleted all negative references to the World Bank from their published version of my contribution to a Prague conference. (You can download the unedited version of my essay here.) I was naturally upset with the OECD, but fortunately my employer at the time (the UN Secretariat) did not censor my private writings, and allowed me to circulate the piece as a UN discussion paper. Writers ought to welcome censorship, as this brings them publicity and, in the end, more readers!

Ben Bernanke and the Fed

Thursday, July 22nd, 2010

I have work to do – running some regressions on Chinese migration data – but I can’t resist the temptation to read the always interesting blog of Scott Sumner. He admits that he is depressed by the rantings of supposed  monetary experts like Bernanke, but can’t help but write about it, just as the rest of us cannot help but read about it, I suppose. Anyway, this passage caught my eye:

Here’s what [Fed Chairman Ben] Bernanke says about the prospects for reaching their [the Federal Reserve's] goals:

The unemployment rate is expected to decline to between 7 and 7-1/2 percent by the end of 2012. Most participants viewed uncertainty about the outlook for growth and unemployment as greater than normal, and the majority saw the risks to growth as weighted to the downside. Most participants projected that inflation will average only about 1 percent in 2010 and that it will remain low during 2011 and 2012, with the risks to the inflation outlook roughly balanced.

Bernanke’s lucky that Congress doesn’t have a clue as to how to interpret Fed-speak, because he is basically saying the following:

1.  The Fed has reduced its implicit inflation target below 2%, indeed below even 1.5%.

2.  The Fed sees more downside risk on jobs, but puts a zero weight on jobs in its policy deliberations.

Scott Sumner. “No We Can’t”, The Money Illusion, 21 July 2010.

Jeffrey Sachs on stimulus

Thursday, July 22nd, 2010

The “austerity debate” continues at the Financial Times. Today there is only one contribution, from Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs. Professor Sachs agrees there is need for stimulus, but argues that what needs to be stimulated is investment, not consumption.

The striking feature in the current debate about austerity and stimulus has been the lack of attention to investment. Consumers will not provide the engine of recovery, nor should they after overspending for a decade. Instead, the US and Europe should be using the recent corrective boost in saving rates to promote long-term investments in physical and human capital as the proper way back to sustained growth. ….

At a time when China is building hundreds of miles of subway lines, tens of thousands of miles of highways, a couple of dozen nuclear power plants, and a network of tens of thousands of miles of high-speed intercity rail lines, the US struggles to launch a single substantial project. China saves and invests; the US talks, consumes, borrows, and talks some more.

It is wrong in this context to believe that the only choice is further fiscal stimulus versus a repeat of the Great Depression. Further short-term tax cuts or transfers on top of America’s $1,500bn budget deficit are unlikely to do much to boost demand, while they would greatly increase anxieties over future fiscal retrenchment. Households are hunkering down, and many will regard an added transfer payment as a temporary windfall that is best used to pay down debt, not boost spending.

Jeffrey Sachs, “Sow the seeds of long-term growth”, Financial Times, 22 July 2010.

Sachs’ proposal for a “US investment recovery plan” consists of government spending on clean energy and infrastructure and “more education spending at secondary, vocation and bachelor-degree levels”.

Paul Krugman, who works for a rival newspaper, is not participating in the FT debate. Nonetheless, Krugman is clearly in the stimulus camp on this issue. In two blog posts (here and here), Krugman responded to Ken Rogoff’s assertion that there is “No need for a panicked fiscal surge”.

historian Niall Ferguson responds to economist Brad DeLong

Wednesday, July 21st, 2010

Economists really do seem to struggle with history – and sometimes geography, too. Brad DeLong needs to remember that the Financial Times is published in London. As far as most combatants were concerned, the second world war broke out in September 1939. So when I wrote “The federal debt burden [in the United States] rose only slightly – from 40-45 per cent of GDP – prior to the outbreak of the second world war”, I was referring to the increase between 1933 and 1939.

[...]

The current [US] debt explosion relies heavily on foreign capital. Note to the compulsive stimulators: according to the latest Treasury International Capital data, China – the federal government’s single biggest foreign creditor – has quietly reduced its holdings of US Treasuries by $72bn since last July, from 13 per cent of the total debt in public hands to just 10 per cent.

In common with other stimulators, Prof De Long is confident that the day when “government action begins to crack the status of the US Treasury bond as a safe asset” will “probably not” come soon. The gentlemen in Beijing may be less sanguine.

Niall Ferguson, “1939 and all that …”, Financial Times, 21 July 2010.

Brad DeLong may be an economist, but he is also a skilled historian who does not “struggle with history”. Although World War II formally began in September 1939, when German troops invaded Poland, the US entered only after the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941. The second date is the relevant one for the United States.

Also in the FT today, there are contributions to the austerity debate from Ken Rogoff (“No need for a panicked fiscal surge”) and Tim Harford (“A sunlit Keynesian paradise awaits our grandchildren”).

Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff is co-author (with Carmen Reinhart) of “This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly”, published last year by Princeton University Press. Economist and FT journalist Tim Harford is author of a popular book, “The Undercover Economist”.

stimulus vs austerity continued

Tuesday, July 20th, 2010

The debate rages on at the Financial Times. Berkeley economic historian Brad DeLong today takes the stimulus side, and Harvard historian Niall Ferguson defends austerity. Neither disappoints.

It was said of the Bourbons that they forgot nothing and learned nothing. The same could easily be said of some of today’s latter-day Keynesians. They cannot and never will forget the policy errors made in the US in the 1930s. But they appear to have learned nothing from all that has happened in economic theory since the publication of their bible, John Maynard Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, in 1936.

In its caricature form, the debate goes like this. The Keynesians, haunted by the spectre of Herbert Hoover, warn that the US in still teetering on the brink of another Depression. Nothing is more likely to bring this about, they argue, than a premature tightening of fiscal policy. This was the mistake Franklin Roosevelt made after the 1936 election. Instead, we need further fiscal stimulus.

Niall Ferguson, “Today’s Keynesians have learnt nothing”, Financial Times, 20 July 2010.

Brad DeLong’s counterblast:

In 1942 the US ran a federal budget deficit of 14.8 per cent of GDP; in 1943 30.8 per cent; in 1944 23.3 per cent; and in 1945 22.0 per cent – a four-year average deficit of 22.7 per cent of GDP.

Today, in 2010, the US is running a federal budget deficit that the CBO estimates at 10.3 per cent of GDP. Its score of Obama’s budget proposals has that deficit falling next year to 8.9 per cent of GDP, then over the next two years to 4.5 per cent of GDP, and remaining in the 4-5 per cent of GDP range for the rest of this decade – for an average CBO-scored Obama policy deficit of 5.3 per cent over the next eight years.

Brad DeLong, “Deficit data and the fog of war”, Financial Times, 21 July 2010.

See also Brad DeLong’s original post, “It is far too soon to end expansion”, Financial Times, 20 July 2010.